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The Internal Revenue Service Summons to
Produce Documents: Powers, Procedures,
and Taxpayer Defenses
Nancy I. Kenderdine*
The authorized mission of the Internal Revenue Service' is
to "encourage and achieve the highest possible degree of volun-
tary compliance with the tax laws and regulations and to main-
tain the highest degree of public confidence in the integrity and
efficiency of the Service."' 2 This Article examines one of the
powers granted to the Service to help it achieve that goal: the
power to compel the production of documentary evidence by
summons.
3
The Service's summons power is governed by sections 7602
through 7610 of the Internal Revenue Code.4 Section 7602 au-
thorizes the Secretary to examine any books, papers, records,
or other data that may be relevant or material to an inquiry
into tax liability.5 The same section empowers the Secretary to
summon any person liable for tax, any officers or employees of
that person, or any third party whose books of account contain
entries relating to that person's business transactions, to ap-
pear and produce documents or give testimony under oath.6
This power is conferred on the Service to aid it in investigating
civil tax liability; section 7602 does not expressly empower the
Service to use its summons power pursuant to criminal investi-
gations.7
* Assistant Professor of Law, Oklahoma City University School of Law.
1. Hereinafter the Service or the IRS.
2. IRS Statement of Organization and Functions, 39 Fed. Reg. 11,572
(1974).
3. See I.R.C. §§ 7602-7610.
4. Hereinafter the Code.
5. I.R.C. § 7602(1).
6. Id. § 7602(2), (3).
7. The Secretary is authorized to summon materials
[f) or the purpose of ascertaining the correctness of any return, making
a return where none has been made, determining the liability of any
person for an internal revenue tax or the liability at law or in equity of
any transferee or fiduciary or any person in respect of any internal rev-
enue tax, or collecting any such liability.
Id. § 7602. The Supreme Court has said that these purposes do not justify sum-
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In recent years, United States Supreme Court decisions
have significantly fortified the Service's summons power.8 The
Court has quietly transformed the IRS administrative sum-
mons from a device used primarily for the purpose of investi-
gating civil tax liability to one that now may be used for the
sole purpose of furthering criminal investigations.9 During this
period, the Court also has placed the protection of certain con-
stitutional safeguards and common law privileges beyond the
reach of taxpayers who are undergoing criminal tax investiga-
tion.10
This Article examines the maze of procedural and substan-
tive law surrounding the IRS' summons power. It demon-
strates the need for a clearer delineation of the limits on this
power, and the desirability of judicial or statutory reform in
this area of law. Section I briefly details the general scope of
the Service's summons power, and section II elaborates on sev-
eral of the special problems related to the scope of its third-
party summons power. The next three sections examine the
various objections that taxpayers commonly raise in resisting
IRS summonses. Section I sets forth the procedure the Serv-
ice must follow in issuing a summons, section IV discusses the
dwindling availability of certain constitutional and common law
defenses, and section V critically examines the Supreme
Court's recent evisceration of the legal principal that had previ-
ously been taxpayers' most effective objection to enforce-
monses issued solely for the purpose of obtaining evidence for criminal
charges. See United States v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 437 U.S. 298, 317 n.18 (1978);
note 218 infra.
8. See United States v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 437 U.S. 298 (1978); United
States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976); Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976);
Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973).
9. See United States v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 437 U.S. 298 (1978). In
LaSalle, the special agent who issued the summons did so for the sole purpose
of obtaining criminal evidence. The Supreme Court enforced the summons,
however, since the taxpayer did not "disprove the actual existence of a valid
civil tax determination or collection purpose by the Service." Id. at 316. Thus,
courts will now enforce a summons issued by a special agent whose sole per-
sonal intent is to gather criminal evidence, so long as the taxpayer challenging
the summons does not meet the heavy burden of disproving a valid civil inves-
tigation purpose by the service as an institution. See id.
10. The applicability of the fourth amendment, see text accompanying
notes 109-125 infra, and the fifth amendment, see text accompanying notes 126-
163 infra, to IRS summonses has been almost totally eroded by recent deci-
sions. Similarly, the attorney-client privilege has been narrowly interpreted
when IRS third-party summonses are involved, see text accompanying notes
175-187 infra. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has indicated that it will not
recognize an accountant-client privilege. See Couch v. United States, 409 U.S.
322 (1973); text accompanying notes 164-174 infra.
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ment-that an IRS summons may not be issued for the sole
purpose of gathering evidence of criminal conduct. Section VI
concludes by proposing that Congress or the courts correct this
situation by imposing a probable cause standard upon certain
IRS summonses.
I. SCOPE OF THE SERVICE'S SUMMONS POWER
The Internal Revenue Code grants the Service broad power
to examine documents and to summon persons for testimony.'1
This grant of power is tempered, however, by two statutory lim-
itations. First, the documents or testimony sought by an IRS
summons must be "relevant and material" to a legitimate in-
vestigation of tax liability.12 Second, "[n]o taxpayer shall be
subjected to unnecessary examination or investigations, and
only one inspection of a taxpayer's books of account shall be
made for each taxable year ... unless the [Service], after in-
vestigation, notifies the taxpayer that an additional inspection
is necessary."'13 These limitations have been the basis of many
taxpayer objections to enforcement of IRS summonses. Courts
generally have not, however, been sympathetic to the chal-
lenges. Their decisions, which broadly interpret all the statu-
tory provisions, have one common thread: the conviction that
"any other holding... would thwart and defeat the appropri-
ate investigatory powers that the Congress has placed in the
Secretary [which are necessary] to carry out the broad respon-
sibilities [delegated to the Service] for the administration and
enforcement of the internal revenue laws.'
14
The section 7602 requirement that summoned information
be relevant and material provides no practical check on the
11. [TIhe Secretary is authorized-
(1) To examine any books, papers, records, or other data which may
be relevant or material to such inquiry;(2) To summon the person liable for tax or required to perform the
act, or any officer or employee of such person, or any person hay-
ing possession, custody, or care of books of account containing en-
tries relating to the business of the person liable for tax or
required to perform the act, or any other person the Secretary
may deem proper, to appear before the Secretary... to produce
such books, papers, records, or other data, and to give such testi-
mony under oath, as may be relevant or material to such inquiry;
and(3) To take such testimony of the person concerned, under oath, as
may be relevant or material to such inquiry.
LR.C. § 7602.
12. Id.
13. Id. § 7605(b) (emphasis added).
14. Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 533-34 (1971).
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Service's investigatory power. The test for determining if infor-
mation is relevant and material is simply whether it "might
throw light upon the correctness of the return" or upon tax-
payer liability.15 This easily met test is similar to the one used
for determining materiality in grand jury investigations,16 and
relevance in pretrial discovery.' 7 With respect to relevance and
materiality, the enforcement of IRS summonses is governed by
the same general criteria as those that control the investigative
subpoenas of federal administrative and regulatory agencies.18
Although the limitation of one inspection per taxable year
has inspired much litigation,19 it was the requirement of sec-
tion 7605(b) that examinations and inspections not be "unnec-
essary" which led to the significant case of United States v.
Powell.20 In Powell, a taxpayer refused to honor an IRS sum-
mons concerning his 1958 and 1959 returns because he had pre-
viously been examined for both those years, and because the
statute of limitations had run on all possible tax actions except
those premised on fraud. The taxpayer argued that the Service
must demonstrate grounds for its belief that fraud had been
committed before the summons could be enforced.2 ' The dis-
trict court, however, ordered production, finding that the inves-
tigating agent's affidavit, which stated only that he had reason
to believe that the taxpayer fraudulently falsified his return by
15. See Foster v. United States, 265 F.2d 183, 187 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 360
U.S. 912 (1959).
16. See Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 216 (1946).
17. The test for relevance in pretrial discovery is whether the information
sought has some possible bearing on the subject matter of the action. See, e.g.,
La Chemise LaCoste v. Alligator Co., 60 F.R.D. 164, 171 (D. Del. 1973); Dart In-
dus., Inc. v. Liquid Nitrogen Processing, 50 F.R.D. 286, 292 (D. Del. 1970). "[T]he
concept of relevance for discovery purposes is not limited by considerations of
evidentiary admissibility at trial, but is interpreted broadly to afford the parties
liberal access to evidence in advance of trial." Quaker Chair Corp. v. Litton
Bus. Sys., Inc., 71 F.R.D. 527, 531 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
18. See generally United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632 (1950);
Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946).
19. See, e.g., National Plate & Window Glass Co. v. United States, 254 F.2d
92, 93 (2d Cir. 1958) (per curiam) (cursory examination of plaintiff taxpayer's
records incident to the investigation of another related corporation did not con-
stitute an inspection within the meaning of section 7605), cert. denied, 358 U.S.
822 (1958); United States v. Moriarity, 311 F. Supp. 144, 146 (E.D. Wis. 1969) (a
reexamination of books and records that is part of a continuing examination is
not a violation of section 7605 one inspection requirement), affid on other
grounds, 435 F.2d 347 (7th Cir. 1970). See also United States v. Interstate Tool &
Eng'r Corp., 526 F.2d 59 (7th Cir. 1975); United States v. Giordano, 419 F.2d 564
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1037 (1969); DeMasters v. Arend, 313 F.2d 79
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 936 (1963).
20. 379 U.S. 48 (1964).
21. Id. at 52-53.
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overstating expenses, was sufficient to show necessity.2 2 The
Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the challenged investi-
gation was unnecessary unless the Service could show, at the
adversary enforcement hearing, that it possessed information
"which might cause a reasonable man to suspect that there had
been fraud in the return."23 The agent's affidavit, of course, was
unable to satisfy this probable cause standard.
The Supreme Court disagreed, refusing to equate necessity
with probable cause or any other similar requirement.2 4 It rea-
soned that if the Commissioner needed certain information
from a taxpayer's records to determine whether fraud had oc-
curred, the investigation was necessary.2s The Court expressed
the belief that more stringent interpretation of the term "neces-
sity" would hinder the Commissioner in carrying out investiga-
tions which he felt were warranted.26 The Court concluded that
Congress enacted section 7605(b) merely to protect honest tax-
payers from repetitive visits bordering on harassment by lower-
echelon agents, 27 and that to read the section as imposing a
probable cause standard would "substantially overshoot the
goal which the legislators sought to attain."2 8
The Court in Powell explained precisely what the Service
would be required to demonstrate at enforcement hearings,
and placed the more formidable burden of showing an abuse of
the summons process on taxpayers. Under Powell, the four el-
ements of the prima facie showing of necessity that the Service
must make at enforcement hearings are: (1) that the investiga-
tion is conducted pursuant to a legitimate purpose, (2) that the
summoned information is relevant to that purpose, (3) that the
information sought is not already within the Commissioner's
possession, and (4) that the proper procedure has been fol-
lowed.29 In recent years, the legitimate-purpose requirement is
the only one of these four that has proved viable as a perma-
nent bar to the enforcement of IRS summonses 3 0
22. Id. at 50.
23. United States v. Powell, 325 F.2d 914, 915 (3d Cir. 1963), rev'd, 379 U.S.
48 (1964).
24. United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 53 (1964).
25. Id.
26. Id. at 53-54.
27. Id. at 55-56. The Court fortified this conclusion by quoting Senator
Penrose, who had noted that the requirement of necessity "Will go a long way
toward relieving petty annoyances on the part of honest taxpayers." Id. at 55
(quoting 61 CONG. REC. 5855 (1921)).
28. 379 U.S. at 56.
29. Id. at 57-58.
30. See text accompanying notes 189-243 infra.
19791
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H. PROCEDURAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SCOPE OF
THE SERVICE'S THIRD-PARTY SUMMONS POWER
The Service's summons power extends to records, books,
and documents that are in the possession of persons other than
the one whose tax liability is under investigation.3 1 The Serv-
ice frequently employs its power to issue such third-party sum-
monses since information relevant to tax liability is often
maintained in the normal course of business by various busi-
ness organizations or institutional record keepers. Bank
records of checks and deposits, receipts of credit card transac-
tions, records of employers, and contracts are but a few exam-
ples of such information.
The third-party summons has always been a source of spe-
cial problems for taxpayers.32 Although the summoned third
party may have objections of its own to compliance, it is nor-
mally the unsummoned taxpayer who is most concerned with
the information sought. It is the taxpayer who will want to
raise objections to the Service's examination of the summoned
material, and ensure that the third party does not comply
before such objections can be raised at an enforcement hear-
ing.
In order for taxpayers to adequately protect themselves
from third-party summonses, two procedural rights are neces-
sary: they must receive notice that a summons relating to their
tax liability has been issued, and they must have the ability to
stay compliance and to intervene in the enforcement proceed-
ings. Prior to the 1976 Tax Reform Act,33 taxpayers had no legal
right to notice of third-party summonses in which they were
implicated. Furthermore, their right to intervene in enforce-
31. See I.R.C. §§ 7602(2), 7609.
32. One problem is determining whether the taxpayer implicated by the
third-party summons has a protectable interest substantial enough to justify
his intervention in the summons enforcement proceeding. See United States v.
Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976); text accompanying notes 110-120 infra. Another
problem is the so-called John Doe summons. See H.R. REP. No. 658, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess. 310-12, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2897, 3206-08
[hereinafter cited as H.R. REP.]; S. REP. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 372-73, re-
printed in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3439, 3801-03 [hereinafter cited
as S. REP.]; text accompanying notes 90-96 infra. A third problem, raised by
the passage of I.R.C. § 7609, is how courts should deal with a summons issued
to a person defined as a third-party record keeper when the material sought by
the summons is not related to that person's function as a record keeper. See
United States v. Exxon Co., 450 F. Supp. 472 (D. Md. 1978); text accompanying
notes 72-78 infra.




ment proceedings had been severely limited by Supreme Court
decisions.3
In Reisman v. Caplin,35 the United States Supreme Court
stated that a taxpayer could restrain third-party compliance
until it was ordered by a district court in a proper enforcement
proceeding.36 The Reisman Court also noted that "third parties
might intervene to protect their interests, [and] in the event
the taxpayer is not a party to the summons... , he, too, may
intervene. '37 Following the Reisman decision, the circuits were
unable to agree whether this language indicated that taxpayers
could intervene as a matter of right in all cases in which their
records were involved,38 or whether taxpayers first had to
demonstrate the existence of a substantial protectable interest
as required by rule 24(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure.39
In Donaldson v. United States,4° decided in 1971, the
Supreme Court resolved this conflict. While investigating Don-
aldson's tax liability, the Service had issued summonses both
to his former employer, the Acme Circus, and to Acme's ac-
countant. The summonses directed both parties to testify and
produce certain records relating to Donaldson's employment. 41
Donaldson secured a temporary restraining order, and the
Service moved for enforcement under Code section 7604(a). 42
34. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976); Donaldson v.
United States, 400 U.S. 517 (1971).
35. 375 U.S. 440 (1963).
36. Id. at 450.
37. Id. at 449.
38. See, e.g., United States v. Benford, 406 F.2d 1192 (7th Cir. 1969); United
States v. Bank of Commerce, 405 F.2d 931 (3d Cir. 1969); Justice v. United
States, 365 F.2d 312 (6th Cir. 1966).
39. See, e.g., O'Donnell v. Sullivan, 364 F.2d 43 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 385
U.S. 969 (1966); In re Cole, 342 F.2d 5 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 950 (1965).
Rule 24(a) provides that, in general, a person shall be permitted to intervene
"when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction
which is the subject of the action and he is so situated that the disposition of
the action may as a practical matter impair ... his ability to protect that inter-
est." FED. R. Cxv. P. 24(a).
40. 400 U.S. 517 (1971).
41. The summoned records included any employment applications and
other records that might contain social security numbers or other background
data, any contracts between Donaldson and the Circus, and any W-2 forms,
checks, vouchers, or correspondence relating to financial transactions between
Acme and Donaldson. Id. at 519.
42. LR.C. § 7604 provides in relevant part-
(a) Jurisdiction of district court.-If any person is summoned
under the internal revenue laws to appear, to testify, or to produce
books, papers, records, or other data, the United States district court
for the district in which such person resides or is found shall have
1979]
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Donaldson petitioned to intervene at the enforcement hearing
as a matter of right43 and raised several objections to the sum-
monses in his proposed answer. The district court refused to
allow the intervention, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed.44 The cir-
cuit court based its decision on the fact that the language in
Reisman45 referred to permissive, not mandatory, intervention.
The court also noted that the summoned materials were simply
Acme's ordinary business records,46 in which the taxpayer had
no interest that was substantial enough to be protected under
rule 24(a). 4 7 The Supreme Court agreed, holding that a tax-
payer has no absolute right to intervene in a third-party en-
forcement proceeding simply because he is the subject of the
investigation.48 The Court concluded that a taxpayer must
demonstrate a significantly protectable interest before inter-
vention would be allowed.49 As examples of such interests, the
Court mentioned information covered by the attorney-client
privilege and materials in which taxpayers have a proprietary
interest.5 0
While the Court was limiting taxpayers' right to intervene
in enforcement hearings, it was also substantially narrowing
the availability of constitutional objections, 51 and the privi-
lege52 and improper purpose5 3 defenses. As a result, lower
courts were seldom able to find the significant protectable in-
terest required by Donaldson.5 4 Moreover, Donaldson was
read by some courts as vitiating even the right to permissive in-
tervention under rule 24(b) 55 on the ground that giving taxpay-
jurisdiction by appropriate process to compel such attendance, testi-
mony, production of books, papers, records, or other data.
(b) Enforcement.-Whenever any person summoned . . . ne-
glects or refuses to obey such summons, or to produce books, papers,
records, or other data, or to give testimony, as required, the Secretary
may apply to the judge of the district court or to a United States com-
missioner... for an attachment against him as for a contempt ....
43. The petition was based on FED. R. Crv. P. 24(a). See note 39 supra.
44. United States v. Mercurio, 418 F.2d 1213 (5th Cir. 1969), a Ffd sub nom.
Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517 (1971).
45. See text accompanying note 37 supra.
46. 418 F.2d at 1214.
47. Id. at 1218.
48. 400 U.S. at 530.
49. Id. at 531.
50. Id. at 530.
51. See text accompanying notes 107-163 infra.
52. See text accompanying notes 164-187 infra.
53. See text accompanying notes 188-243 infra.
54. See, e.g., Luther v. United States, 481 F.2d 429 (9th Cir. 1973); United
States v. Newman, 441 F.2d 165 (5th Cir. 1971); United States v. Price
Waterhouse & Co., 76-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9295 (W.D. Pa. 1975).
55. See note 39 supra.
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ers the ability to participate in such controversies would
"unwarrantedly cast doubt upon and stultify the Service's
every investigatory move. '5 6
In 1976, Congress attempted to remedy the third-party sum-
mons problem by adding section 7609 to the Code. This section
gives taxpayers the right to notice of any summons implicating
them that has been served on a third-party record keeper,57 as
well as the rights to stay its compliance5 8 and to intervene in its
enforcement proceeding.5 9 Third-party record keepers are de-
fined as:
(A) Any mutual savings bank, cooperative bank, domestic building
and loan association, or other savings institution chartered and
supervised as a savings and loan or similar association under
Federal or State law, any bank .... or any credit union...
(B) any consumer reporting agency... ;
(C) any person extending credit through the use of credit cards or
similar devices;
(D) any broker...
(E) any attorney; and
(F) any accountant.6 0
In order to stay compliance under section 7609, a taxpayer
must, within fourteen days of receiving notice of the third-party
summons, give written notice 6 ' to the record keeper not to com-
ply with the summons. If the taxpayer gives proper notice to
stay compliance, the Service may enforce the summons only
under section 7 6 0 4 ,6 and section 7609 gives taxpayers an abso-
lute right to intervene in section 7604 proceedings. 63
The provisions of section 7609, however, do not apply if the
summons is served on an officer or employee of the taxpayer
under investigation," nor do they apply if the purpose of the
summons is merely to determine whether any records of a sus-
pect transaction exist.65 Moreover, to make certain that taxpay-
56. United States v. Newman, 441 F.2d 165, 173 (5th Cir. 1971). See United
States v. Nemetz, 450 F.2d 924, 926 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 988
(1972); United States v. Exxon Co., 450 F. Supp. 472, 480 (D. Md. 1978).
57. A list of persons considered third-party record keepers for the pur-
poses of the subsection is contained at LR.C. § 7609 (a) (3). See text accompany-
ing note 60 infra.
58. I.R.C. § 7609(b) (2).
59. Id. § 7609(b) (1).
60. Id. § 7609(a) (3).
61. Id. § 7609(b) (2).
62. See note 42 supra.
63. "Notwithstanding any other law or rule of law, any person who is enti-
fled to notice of a summons... shall have the right to intervene in any pro-
ceeding with respect to the enforcement of such summons under section 7604."
LR.C. § 7609(b) (1).
64. Id. §7609(a)(4)(A).
65. Id. § 7609(a)(4)(B).
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ers do not stay compliance merely as a delaying tactic, section
7609(e) provides that the running of any statutory period of
limitation on the assessment or collection of taxes, or on re-
lated criminal prosecutions, is suspended for so long as any en-
forcement proceeding or appeal is pending.6 6
There are many third-party summonses, other than the ex-
ceptions specified in section 7609 (a) (4), to which the provisions
of section 7609 do not apply. The concern of Congress was not
that taxpayers receive notice whenever their tax liability is
under investigation, but rather, that "the use of this important
investigative tool should not unreasonably infringe on the civil
rights of taxpayers, including the right to privacy.' '67 Congress
accordingly limited the coverage of section 7609 to summonses
served on persons "engaged in making or keeping the records
involving transactions of other persons. '68 It seems clear that
Congress felt it was the Service's unbridled power to summon
professional accumulators of data that most threatened taxpay-
ers' privacy rights.
Thus, section 7609 would not, for example, change the re-
sult in Donaldson concerning the summons issued to Donald-
son's employer, because the section does not define employers
as third-party record keepers. The statute might apply to the
summons issued to Acme's accountant, however, because third-
party record keepers include "any accountant."69 But the ex-
pectation-of-privacy rationale underlying section 7609 makes it
doubtful that courts would interpret the section as applying to
accountants in situations similar to that in Donaldson.
The justification for supposing such a narrow interpretation
of section 7609 lies in its provision that it applies only where
"the summons requires the production of any portion of
records made or kept of the business transactions or affairs of
any person (other than the person summoned) who is identi-
fied in the description of the records contained in the sum-
mons."7 0 In denying intervention in Donaldson, the Court
66. In order for the running of the statute of limitations to be suspended,
the intervenor must be the person whose tax liability is under investigation, or
his agent, nominee, or "other person acting under the direction or control of
such person." Id. § 7609(e).
67. H.R. REP., supra note 32, at 312, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 2897, 3203.
68. S. REP., supra note 32, at 373, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 3439, 3798.
69. LR.C. § 7609(a) (3) (F). See text accompanying note 60 supra.
70. This language is from the notice provision of section 7609. See I.R.C.
§ 7609(a) (1) (B). The parenthetical qualification that the summoned records
[Vol. 64:73
IRS SUMMONS POWERS
emphasized that the summoned materials were Acme's routine
business records and not records of the taxpayer,71 a fact which
prevented Donaldson from having any protectable interest in
the records. It could be argued, of course, that section 7609 was
enacted to override the Donaldson rule. Then, any records con-
taining information that reflects the affairs of a person under
investigation would be protected so long as they were in a sec-
tion 7609 record keeper's possession. It could also be argued,
however, that section 7609 has simply incorporated the Donald-
son logic. Then, the records kept by Acme's accountant would
not be protected under the section because they were the em-
ployer's business records, not the taxpayer's.
The latter argument is supported by the fact that Congress
did not include employers in the definition of section 7609 rec-
ord keepers. It is difficult to believe that an employer's deci-
sion to use an accountant to maintain his business records
would be the controlling fact in determining whether a tax-
payer-employee is entitled to notice and the right to intervene
if his employer's records are summoned.
One of the few reported lower court cases interpreting sec-
tion 7609(a), United States v. Exxon Co.,7 2 provides further
support for the proposition that courts will choose to narrowly
interpret section 7609(a). In Exxon, a third-party summons di-
rected a corporation to produce its copies of all agreements,
contracts, and correspondence relating to certain property that
the corporation had leased from the taxpayer under investiga-
tion. Checks reflecting lease payments were also requested.
The corporation refused to comply because the taxpayer had
not been given notice of the summons. The main issue at the
enforcement proceeding was whether the corporation qualified
as a third-party record keeper. Exxon argued that section 7609
controlled since Exxon was a person who extends credit to cus-
tomers through the use of credit cards.7 3 The court refused to
classify Exxon as a third-party record keeper, at least for the
limited purposes of the summoned materials, because "the
records sought ... are not the credit records of [the taxpayer]
and do not appear to involve directly the type of business
must be of business transactions or affairs of persons other than the one to
whom the summons is directed, implies that the business records of the sum-
moned third party may not also be considered the business records of the im-
plicated taxpayer.
71. See 400 U.S. at 500.
72. 450 F. Supp. 472 (D. Md. 1978).
73. See id. at 475.
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transactions contemplated in the statute." 74 The court in Ex-
xon relied heavily on legislative history which indicated that
section 7609 was designed for the purpose of safeguarding tax-
payers' legitimate expectations of privacy.7 5 Since the records
at issue were simply records of Exxon's business transactions,
the court concluded that requiring the Service to give the tax-
payer notice would exceed congressional intent.76
The fact situation in Exxon presents a clear case for the
narrow interpretation of section 7609 because the material
sought by the IRS bore no relation to Exxon's function as a
supplier of credit-the function which would qualify Exxon as
a third-party record keeper. The case would be less clear, how-
ever, if an attorney or accountant should refuse to comply with
a third-party summons because the Service has failed to notify
the implicated taxpayer.
The rationale of Exxon indicates that in such a situation
courts will look beyond the simple fact that attorneys and ac-
countants are section 7609 record keepers. The question is how
far beyond the language of the section courts will look. Exxon
suggests that courts may inquire no further than whether the
summoned records are being kept by an attorney or accountant
as an incident of their professional functions. This interpreta-
tion of section 7609 would represent an expansion of taxpayer
rights beyond the Donaldson significant protectable interest
test. Courts, however, may employ an even more circum-
scribed test requiring not only that the summoned records be
kept by an attorney or accountant as an incident of his profes-
sional function, but also that the records be kept on behalf of
74. Id. at 477.
75. "[T]he use of this important investigative tool should not unreasonably
infringe on the civil rights of taxpayers, including the right to privacy." Id. at
476 (quoting H.R. REP., supra note 32, at 307, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 2897, 3203).
76. 450 F. Supp. at 477. As evidence of congressional intent, the court
noted that the House report states that notice is to be sent to the person "who
is identified in the description of the books and records contained in the sum-
mons 'as the person relating to whose business or transactions the books or
records are kept."' Id. at 476 (quoting H.R. REP., supra note 32, at 307, re-
printed in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2897, 3204). From this language,
the court inferred that the notice provisions of section 7609 apply only where
the personal business records of the taxpayer seeking to block compliance are
held by a third-party record keeper. 450 F. Supp. at 476. The court also relied
on the following language from the Senate Report: "For the purposes of these
rules, a third party record keeper is generally to be a person engaged in making
or keeping the records involving transactions of others." Id. at 477 (quoting S.
REP., supra note 32, at 369, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
2897, 3798) (emphasis added).
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the taxpayer under investigation so that the taxpayer has a
protectable interest in them. The latter test, which is sup-
ported by several of the Congressional statements accompany-
ing the enactment of section 7609,77 and by the fact that courts
have not been inclined to read Code provisions any more liber-
ally than necessary, would mean that the section has done vir-
tually nothing to extend taxpayer rights beyond those
presumed by the Donaldson court.
The effect of section 7609 on the Service's third-party sum-
mons power is still unclear. Presumably summonses issued to
record keepers not included in section 7609 will continue to be
judged by the Donaldson standard. It could be argued that by
specifying the situations in which taxpayers have an absolute
right to intervene, Congress delineated the areas where tax-
payer privacy expectations have precedence over the Service's
investigatory powers. Furthermore, it appears that certain
summonses issued to record keepers included in section 7609
may also be judged by the Donaldson standard if courts, rely-
ing on Congressional intent, read the stated exception to sec-
tion 7609--"other than the records of the person summoned"--
to mean that taxpayers must show a proprietary interest in the
records. Thus, despite its impressive list of protected record
keepers, section 7609 may, in many cases, do no more than re-
quire notice to taxpayers in situations where they already had
the right to intervene.78
Ill PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS FOR VALID
ISSUANCE OF AN IRS SUMMONS
The procedural requirements for proper service of an IRS
summons provide taxpayers with several objections to compli-
ance. Proper service may'be accomplished either by delivering
an attested copy "in hand" to the summoned person or by leav-
ing it at his usual place of abode.79 If the summons is for the
production of written matter, the information requested must
77. Both the House and Senate reports note that the provisions of section
7609 are "not intended to expand the substantive rights of those parties in-
volved." H.R. REP., supra note 32, at 309, reprinted in [19761 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 2897, 3205; S. REP., supra note 32, at 370, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 3439, 3800.
78. The House report states that "it should be made clear that the purpose
of this provision is to facilitate the opportunity of the noticee to raise defenses
which are already available under the law." H.R. REP., supra note 32, at 309,
reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2897, 3205.
79. LR.C. § 7603.
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be described "with reasonable certainty. '80 In addition, the
date set for appearance may not be less than ten days from the
date of service.8 '
The Code requires special procedures for third-party sum-
monses.8 2 If a summons is served on a third-party record
keeper and requires production of the business records of any
person other than the record keeper, that person is entitled to
notice of the summons.83 Notice must be given within three
days of service, and no later than fourteen days prior to the
date set for examination.84 The notice of summons must in-
form the taxpayer of his right to stay compliance, and of the
procedure for achieving a stay.85 The IRS' examination of the
summoned material cannot take place prior to the expiration of
the fourteen-day period in which the taxpayer may stay compli-
ance, and if the taxpayer stays compliance, the examination
can take place only upon court order.
86
These special third-party summons provisions do not apply
where the summons is issued "solely to determine the identity
of a person having a numbered account,"87 or merely to expe-
dite the collection of a previously assessed liability.88 If the
Service believes that giving notice to a taxpayer would lead to
attempts to conceal or alter the summoned records, to flight, or
to intimidation or bribery of the summoned third party, it may
petition the United States District Court for an ex parte deter-
mination that there is probable cause to support these beliefs.
If the court makes such a finding, the notice provisions of sec-
tion 7609 are waived.89
Section 7609(f) specifies additional requirements that must
80. Id.
81. Id. § 7605(a).
82. See id. § 7609. Third-party record keepers are defined in section
7609(a) (3). See text accompanying notes 57-78 supra.
83. See I.R.C. § 7609(a) (1). But cf. United States v. Exxon Co., 450 F. Supp.
473 (D. Md. 1978) (summoned records must be personal business of taxpayer
implicated by summons and not merely records of the summoned third party
that reflect its own business dealings with the implicated taxpayer).
84. LR.C. § 7609(a) (1).
85. Id. The notice of summons may be served in the same manner as pro-
vided for the service of a summons, or it may be sent by certified or registered
mail to the taxpayer's last known address. In the absence of a known address,
the notice of summons may be left with the record keeper. Id. § 7609(a) (2).
86. Id. § 7609(d).
87. Id. § 7609(c) (2) (A).
88. Id. § 7609(c) (2) (B).
89. Id. § 7609(g). The proper court for this determination is the district
court for the district within which the person to be summoned resides or is
found. Id. § 7609(h).
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be met for issuing a "John Doe" summons to a third-party rec-
ord keeper. These summonses traditionally have been issued
when the Service has knowledge of a transaction indicating a
possible tax liability but does not know the identity of the ac-
tor. Such summonses typically direct the record keeper to pro-
duce all information relating to the transaction, including any
information concerning the identity of the taxpayer.90 Con-
gress, concerned with the privacy issues these summonses
raise, added John Doe provisions to the Code in the 1976 Tax
Reform Act.9 1
A John Doe summons may now be served only after com-
pletion of a court proceeding in which the Secretary establishes
that the "summons relates to the investigation of a particular
person or ascertainable group," that there is a reasonable basis
to believe that such person or group has failed to comply with a
provision of the tax laws, and that the information sought is not
readily available from other sources. 92 The Senate Finance
Committee stressed in its report93 that these provisions were
added to avoid "fishing expeditions," and to make certain that
the Service's suspicions were based on specific facts. 94 The re-
port added, however, that section 7609(f) was not intended to
impose a probable cause requirement on the Service,95 and that
the burden of section 7609(f) can be met simply by showing
both that a transaction suggestive of improper tax reporting
has occurred, and that previous good faith efforts to identify the
taxpayer have been made without success.96
The Code does not give the IRS authority to enforce its
summonses administratively. Rather, the power to compel at-
tendance, testimony, or production is vested in the United
States District Courts.9 7 If a person refuses to obey a sum-
mons, the Service must apply to the appropriate district court,
90. See United States v. Bisceglia, 420 U.S. 141 (1975).
91. Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520 (current version in scattered sections of
26 U.S.C. (I.R.C.)). Congress, of course, was not concerned only with the pri-
vacy problems raised by John Doe summonses. It recognized that the concern
for privacy must be balanced against the Service's duty to investigate tax liabil-
ity. See S. REP., supra note 32, at 369, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 3439, 3798.
92. I.R.C. § 7609(f).
93. S. REP., supra note 32, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
3439.
94. Id. at 373, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3439, 3802.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 373, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3439, 3802-
03.
97. I.R.C. §§ 7402(b), 7604.
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or to a United States commissioner for that district, for a com-
pliance order. It is only the failure to obey a compliance order
that subjects the summoned party to punishment for con-
tempt,98 since the enforcement action is "an adversary proceed-
ing affording a judicial determination of the challenges to the
summons and giving complete protection to the witness."99
It is important that a person who refuses to comply with an
IRS summons understand the consequences of his refusal.
Section 7210 provides for a criminal penalty consisting of a fine
of not more than $1000, or imprisonment for not more than one
year, upon conviction for failure to comply with a duly issued
summons. Furthermore, section 7604(b) provides that if a sum-
moned person neglects or refuses to obey, the Service may pro-
ceed against him in district court "for an attachment... as for
contempt." Upon a showing of satisfactory proof, the attach-
ment is issued; the person is arrested and brought before the
judge, who then proceeds "to a hearing of the case."100 It has
been held that, prior to an enforcement hearing, the criminal
sanction and attachment procedures apply only where the sum-
moned person "wholly made default or contumaciously refused
to comply."'' The procedures do not apply in situations where
the "witness appears and interposes good faith challenges"
before the hearing officer.10 2
Thus, even though a person is entitled to raise defenses to
a summons at an enforcement hearing begun by the attach-
ment process, 0 3 ignoring a summons is not an advisable
method of challenging it. The correct procedure for challenging
a summons is to appear initially before the IRS hearing officer
and raise all defenses at that time. If the hearing officer denies
the challenge and the party continues his refusal to comply, the
agent who issued the summons must petition for a judicial en-
forcement hearing, under section 7402 or section 7604(a), at
which the taxpayer may renew his objections. This procedure
is deemed a good-faith refusal and will support neither an ap-
plication for attachment under section 7604(b) nor the imposi-
tion of criminal liability under section 7210.104 A district court
order to comply is appealable, since it is a complete and final
98. Id. § 7604(b).
99. Reisnan v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440, 446 (1963). See Donaldson v. United
States, 400 U.S. 517, 521 (1971).
100. I.R.C. § 7604(b).
101. Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440, 475 (1963).
102. Id. at 447.




determination of the obligation to obey the summons.105 If the
person summoned fails to appeal a court order, his objections
to compliance will not be reviewed on appeal from a finding of
contempt based on his refusal.10 6
These procedural requirements suggest a number of objec-
tions that taxpayers may raise in support of their refusal to
comply with IRS summonses. But the problem with procedural
objections is that they often merely delay rather than block en-
forcement. The more effective objections to IRS subpoenas rest
on substantive grounds: the taxpayer must either attack the le-
gitimacy of the purpose for which the summons was issued, or
object to compliance on the grounds of a constitutional right or
a common law privilege.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL AND COMMON LAW OBJECTIONS
TO COMPLIANCE
A. CQNSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
The recent Supreme Court cases considering constitutional
limitations on the IRS' summons power have all considered fac-
tual situations in which constitutional safeguards were held un-
available to taxpayers. 0 7 Taken collectively, these cases
support extremely narrow interpretations of the fourth and
fifth amendments which are based primarily on the concept
that "[r]espect for these [constitutional] principles is eroded
when they leap their proper bounds to interfere with the legiti-
mate interests of society in enforcement of its laws and collec-
tion of the revenues.' 0 8
Given such pronouncements, it is not difficult to conclude
that taxpayers have been deprived of all constitutional rights in
their dealings with the IRS. This conclusion is as yet unjusti-
fied, however, because the recent cases have all involved sum-
monses issued to third parties. It is essential, therefore, to
distinguish between the constitutional protections that may be
invoked by taxpayers when IRS summonses are issued to them
105. See United States v. McDonald, 313 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1963).
106. See United States v. Secor, 476 F.2d 766 (2d Cir. 1973).
107. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976) (fourth amendment pri-
vate papers doctrine may not be invoked by a taxpayer to stay compliance
where records summoned are ordinary business records of third-party record
keeper); Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976) (fifth amendment guaran-
tee against self-incrimination does not apply to voluntarily prepared documen-
tary evidence).
108. Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 336 (1973).
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directly, and those that may be available when summonses are
issued to third parties.
1. The Fourth Amendment
Since the Service is not required to show probable cause in
support of its summonses, 10 9 the fourth amendment's primary
protection" ° is not available to persons who challenge an IRS
summons. When a summons is directed to the taxpayer under
investigation, however, the fourth amendment's protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures".' is available for a
challenge that the summons is too indefinite because the mate-
rial requested is not described with reasonable certainty." 2
This objection is of limited utility, though, since the reasonable
certainty formula has been liberally construed,"3 and the de-
fect may be cured by modification of the summons.
The issue of the availability of fourth amendment objec-
tions is more complicated when summonses are directed to
109. See United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48 (1964); text accompanying
notes 20-28 supra.
110. The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Probable cause exists where the facts and circum-
stances within an officer's personal knowledge and of which he has reasonably
trustworthy information are sufficient in themselves to warrant a person of rea-
sonable caution in the belief that an offense has been or is being committed.
See Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1946); Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
111. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV, quoted in note 110 supra.
112. "[W]hen the summons requires the production of books, papers,
records, or other data, it shall be sufficient if such ... [data] are described
with reasonable certainty." I.R.C. § 7603. See U.S. CONsT. amend. IV, quoted in
note 110 supra; Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 401 (1976).
113. General search warrants are prohibited by the fourth amendment. See
Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1976). It has been held, however, that an
IRS summons seeking the records necessary to audit and prepare a taxpayer's
return is not a general warrant and is, therefore, enforceable. United States v.
Silkman, 543 F.2d 1218, 1220 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 919 (1977). See
also United States v. Giordano, 419 F.2d 564 (8th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397
U.S. 1037 (1970). For the last three decades, courts have applied more relaxed
standards to administrative subpoenas than to search warrants. Compare
United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632 (1950) and Oklahoma Press Pub.
Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946) with FTC v. American Tobacco Co., 264 U.S.
298 (1924). The one notable exception to this trend is the IRS John Doe sum-
mons. See H.R. REP., supra note 32, at 310-12, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEwS 2897, 3206-08; S. REP., supra note 32, at 372-73, reprinted in
[1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3439, 3801-03. See also LR.C. § 7609(f).
[Vol. 64-73
IRS SUMMONS POWERS
third parties. In United States v. Miller,114 the defendant
moved to suppress copies of his bank records, which he alleged
had been obtained by means of a defective grand jury sub-
poena issued to his bank. He argued that because the Bank Se-
crecy Act"15 required that certain records be kept by banks,
permitting the government to obtain the records from the bank
would enable the government to "circumvent the requirements
of the fourth amendment by allowing it to obtain a depositor's
private records without complying with the legal requirements
that would be applicable had it proceeded against him di-
rectly. 11 6 The defendant reasoned that he had a fourth amend-
ment interest in the summoned records because they were
copies of personal records in which he had a legitimate expec-
tation of privacy.1 17
The Supreme Court held that Miller had no legitimate ex-
pectation of privacy in these records and that, therefore, no
fourth amendment interest was implicated."18 A person's per-
sonal checks, the Court stated, were "not confidential commu-
nications but negotiable instruments to be used in commercial
transactions," and both his checks and deposit slips contained
information "voluntarily conveyed to the banks.., in the ordi-
nary course of business."119 It is clear the Court in Miller felt
that a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in papers
voluntarily relinquished in the course of commercial transac-
tions, and, accordingly, that the papers cannot be considered
114. 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
115. 12 U.S.C. § 1829b(d) (1976).
116. 425 U.S. at 441.
117. Id. at 442.
118. Id. In California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974), the
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the record-keeping require-
ments of the Bank Secrecy Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1829b(d) (1976). The Court reserved
the question of whether a bank customer could later challenge the bank's deliv-
ery to the government of records kept pursuant to the Act. Justice Marshall,
dissenting, pointed out-
[I]t is ironic that although the majority deems the bank customers'
Fourth Amendment claims premature, it also intimates that once the
bank has made copies of a customer's checks, the customer no longer
has standing to invoke his Fourth Amendment rights when a demand
is made on the bank by the Government for the records .... By ac-
cepting the Government's bifurcated approach to the recordkeeping re-
quirement and the acquisition of records, the majority engages in a
ollow charade whereby Fourth Amendment claims are to be labeled
premature until such time as they can be deemed too late.
California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 97 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing), quoted in United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 455 (1975) (Marshall, J., dis-
senting).




private in the fourth amendment sense.120
When Congress added the section 7609 third-party record
keeper provisions to the Code,121 it cited Miller as one of the
decisions that spurred this codification of taxpayers' protect-
able zone of privacy. 122 There is no question that an IRS sum-
mons issued to a bank in a Miller-type situation would now fall
under the protective provisions of section 7609. The current un-
certainty is over the extent to which Congress intended section
7609 to give taxpayers new substantive rights regarding objec-
tions to enforcement.
If courts read section 7609 as merely giving taxpayers the
procedural right to notice of a third-party summons so that
they can intervene and raise the traditionally recognized objec-
tions to enforcement, then, despite its concern for the harsh
Miller ruling, Congress will have failed in its attempt to ad-
dress the privacy problem. Section 7609 should be read to give
taxpayers an expanded substantive right to object to the rele-
vancy and scope of third-party summonses. Congress surely
intended not only to recognize taxpayers' privacy interest in
those documents that fall within the Court's narrow definition
of private papers, but also to expand taxpayers' protectable
zone of privacy to include certain other documents that might
not meet the Court's definition. Any other interpretation of
section 7609 would render its protections completely illusory.123
Even if courts were to interpret section 7609 as expanding
taxpayers' protectable zone of privacy, certain taxpayers will
face yet another problem. If the third party in possession of
the taxpayer's records is not a section 7609 record keeper,124 a
120. According to the Court in Miller, "[t]he depositor takes the risk, in re-
vealing his affairs to another, that the information will be conveyed by that per-
son to the Government." Id. at 442.
121. LR.C. § 7609. See text accompanying notes 57-68 supra.
122. See S. REP., supra note 32, at 368 n.1, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 3439, 3798.
123. The potential justification for not allowing taxpayers to successfully
raise the too indefinite objection, even though they have been given notice and
the right to intervene, lies in the language of the House report on section 7609.
The report stressed that it was "not intended to expand the substantive rights
of these parties," but rather to "facilitate the opportunity of the noticee to raise
defenses which are already available." H.R. REP., supra note 32, at 309, re-
printed in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2897, 3205. The objection based
on indefiniteness is a defense previously available, but not to taxpayers in the
third-party summons situation because of the holding in Miller. The question
now is how the courts will view this particular objection: Is it merely an objec-
tion that the proper procedure has not been followed, or is it an attempt to
raise a new substantive right, i.e., an expanded expectation of privacy?
124. See text accompanying note 60 supra.
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taxpayer's fourth amendment objection will still have to pass
the Miller privacy test in order to succeed. The Miller decision
hints that confidential communications would be within the ex-
pected zone of privacy.125 If this vague reference to confiden-
tial communications refers to nothing more than material
covered by the attorney-client privilege, it adds nothing beyond
section 7609 since the statute already defines attorneys as
third-party record keepers.
Thus, the practical value of a fourth amendment objection
is simply to delay enforcement until the material requested is
more reasonably described. As a permanent bar to compliance,
the objection is of little value.
2. The Fifth Amendment
The fifth amendment's protection against self-incrimination
is not normally available as an intervenor's defense to a third-
party summons, 126 even if the record keeper is the taxpayer's
attorney. 127 The fifth amendment's applicability has been lim-
ited to those situations in which a taxpayer is compelled to be a
witness against himself, since it "is a personal privilege
[which] adheres basically to the person, not to the information
that may incriminate him."'128 The only exception to this gen-
eral rule is "where constructive possession is so clear or
[where] relinquishment of possession [is] so temporary and
insignificant as to leave the personal compulsion... substan-
tially intact."'1 29 It is normally the element of personal posses-
sion, not ownership, that gives rise to the possibility of fifth
amendment immunity.130
Even where a summons for documentary evidence is is-
sued to a taxpayer directly, the availability of the fifth amend-
ment objection to bar compliance has been placed very much
125. In analyzing the defendant's claim that he had a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy in the summoned documents, the court remarked that "[t]he
checks are not confidential communications but negotiable instruments to be
used in commercial transactions." 425 U.S. at 442.
126. See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 397 (1975); Couch v. United
States, 409 U.S. 322, 329, 336 (1973).
127. See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 397 (1975). It should be noted,
however, that if the taxpayer could have successfully argued the private-papers
defense when the documents were in his hands, then, if he turned the docu-
ments over to his attorney for the purpose of obtaining legal advice, he could
successfully assert the attorney-client privilege.
128. Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328 (1973).
129. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 398 (1975) (citing Couch v. United
States, 409 U.S. 322, 333 (1973)).
130. See Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 331 (1973).
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in doubt by Fisher v. United States.'31 The Supreme Court in
Fisher -confronted the rule enunciated in Boyd v. United
States132 that to compel production of private papers violates
the fifth as well as the fourth amendment. 133 The Supreme
Court has long struggled to define the private papers that are
protected from summons, and the record of this struggle re-
flects a constant narrowing of the private-paper concept.'3 In
Fisher, the Court noted that to the extent Boyd rests upon the
proposition that subpoenas for mere evidence violate the fifth
amendment, its "foundations... have been washed away."'13 5
The Court also observed that "the prohibition against forcing
the production of private papers has long been a rule searching
for a rationale consistent with the proscriptions of the fifth
amendment against compelling a person to give 'testimony'
that incriminates him."'136 Throughout the Fisher decision, the
Court emphasized that most documentary evidence is not com-
pelled testimony, and that the privilege protects persons only
from "being incriminated by [their] own compelled testimonial
communications."'1 37
The summonses challenged in Fisher sought work papers
of the taxpayer's accountant and copies of communications
from the accountant to the taxpayer, both of which were in the
taxpayer's possession. The Court held that the fifth amend-
ment privilege was inapplicable to these items because the
summons did "not compel oral testimony," nor did it compel
the taxpayer to "restate, repeat, or affirm the truth of the con-
tents of the documents sought."'1 38 The mere fact that the pa-
pers were based on information provided by the taxpayer
which might incriminate him was not sufficient to invoke the
privilege, since the papers were not prepared by the taxpayer,
"and they [contained] no testimonial declarations by him.''139
In Fisher, the Court also examined the communicative as-
pects inherent in the compelled act of producing evidence. It
131. 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
132. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
133. Id. at 634-35.
134. See, e.g., Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85 (1974) (records of any busi-
ness entity other than sole proprietorship not considered private papers); Sha-
piro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1 (1948) (records required to be kept by law are
outside private-papers concept). See also Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361
(1911).







found implicit in compelled production the concession that the
papers existed and were in the taxpayer's possession and con-
trol.14° The Court believed, however, that these tacit admis-
sions did not "[rise] to the level of testimony within the
protection of the fifth amendment" because the summoned
materials were the accountant's papers, and their existence or
possession was not at issue.141 The Court also felt that these
tacit admissions, even if testimonial, would not be incriminat-
ing, since it is not illegal to seek accounting help or to possess
accounting workpapers.142 Finally, the Court decided that re-
sponding to these subpoenas would not authenticate the
records because the taxpayer did not prepare them and could
not vouch for their accuracy.1 43 Since authenticating testimony
would be necessary before these materials could be used
against the taxpayer, the mere act of production could not be
self-incriminating.14
The Court in Fisher limited the protections of the fifth
amendment to papers prepared by the taxpayer himself. Thus,
writings of another person cannot be deemed direct testimonial
statements of the summoned taxpayer. The disturbing aspect
of Fisher, though, is that the Court did not decide "[w]hether
the Fifth Amendment would shield the taxpayer from produc-
ing his own tax records."145
Fisher indicates that the Court will no longer recognize a
fifth amendment argument based solely on the fact that the
taxpayer prepared the records sought. First, the Court stressed
a line of cases holding that private incriminating statements
may be overheard and used in evidence if they are not com-
pelled at the time they are uttered.146 Second, the Court noted
that "the precise claim sustained in Boyd would now be re-
jected," although it conceded that Boyd's pronouncement "that
a person may not be forced to produce his private papers" has
appeared as dictum in several post-Boyd opinions.147 Finally,
the Court observed:
[A] s far as this record demonstrates, the preparation of all of the pa-
140. Id. at 410.
141. Id. at 411.
142. Id. at 412.
143. Id. at 413.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 414.
146. Id. at 407-08, 410 n.11. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967);
Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967); Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323
(1966).
147. 425 U.S. at 408.
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pers sought in these cases was wholly voluntary, and they cannot be
said to contain compelled testimonial evidence, either of the taxpayer
or of anyone else. The taxpayer cannot avoid compliance with the sub-
poena merely by asserting that the item of evidence which he is re-
quired to produce contains incriminating writing, whether his own or
that of someone else.
1 4 8
Taken literally, this statement means that the privilege is un-
available unless the element of compulsion was present while
the taxpayer prepared the records. Thus, any private paper
voluntarily prepared will be mere evidence subject to the
fourth amendment prohibition against unreasonable search
and seizure, but not compelled testimony protected by the fifth
amendment.
Since the Court apparently is unwilling to recognize the in-
herent testimonial aspects of private records, fifth amendment
objections to the production of taxpayer records will have to
rely on the communicative aspects of the act of production be-
cause this is where the compulsion occurs. Thus, when ob-
jecting on fifth amendment grounds, it now is essential to
stress the testimonial elements, such as admission of the exist-
ence of the material, that are implicit in the production of pri-
vate papers, unless, of course, there was actual compulsion in
the preparation of the papers.149
Unfortunately, in its discussion of the implicit communica-
tive aspects inherent in production, the Court in Fisher de-
parted from the careful analysis that marked the remainder of
its decision. If the Court really meant to imply that the admis-
sion of the papers' existence might rise to the level of testi-
mony only if existence were at issue,150 its logic is difficult to
follow. The summoned material's testimonial aspect might
148. Id. at 409-10 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
149. In Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62 (1968), and Marchetti v. United
States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968), the privilege against self-incrimination was success-
fully invoked to prohibit prosecution for failure to file wagering forms, register,
and pay wagering taxes. But cf. Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1 (1948)
(records required to be kept by law that are neutral on their face are not within
the self-incrimination privilege).
150. The Court noted:
It is doubtful that implicitly admitting the existence and posses-
sion of the papers rises to the level of testimony within the protection
of the Fifth Amendment .... The existence and location of the papers
are a foregone conclusion and the taxpayer adds little or nothing to the
sum total of the Government's information by conceding that he in fact
has the papers.
425 U.S. at 411. In a concurring opinion, Justice Brennan questioned the major-
ity's logic on this issue, stating, "I know of no Fifth Amendment principle which
makes the testimonial nature of evidence and, therefore, one's protection
against incriminating himself, turn on the strength of the Government's case
against him." Id. at 429 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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present an evidentiary question of relevance depending on
whether its existence is in issue, but it is not apparent how the
importance of the summoned material's existence to the gov-
ernment's case can alter its nature from testimonial to nontesti-
monial.
Whether the admission, implicit in production, of a docu-
ment's existence could ever be both testimonial and incriminat-
ing under the rationale of Fisher is highly debatable. Although
the admission might prove testimonial, the self-incrimination
hurdle, as defined in Fisher, would be nearly impossible to
clear. 5 1 Apparently, the mere existence of the papers, or their
possession, must be in itself illegal before the admission of
their existence and possession will be incriminating. And
since, according to Fisher, the only compelled testimony is the
admission that the papers exist, the contents of the requested
materials will always be beyond fifth amendment protection.152
The Court in Fisher did, however, seem willing to accept
the proposition that production would force authentication of
incriminating evidence. 53 Thus, while authentication is actu-
ally an evidentiary rather than a fifth amendment issue, the
Court's discussion of its inapplicability to accountants' papers
leaves the door open for its continued use when taxpayer-pre-
pared papers are involved.154 In United States v. Beattie, 55 the
Second Circuit relied on the authentication aspect of produc-
tion' 56 in applying the fifth amendment privilege to summoned
copies of memoranda and other correspondence that were ini-
tially sent by a taxpayer to his accountant, but which were cur-
151. See 425 U.S. at 412.
152. This inescapable ramification of the majority's logic provoked strong
criticism from two Justices. Justice Brennan charged that the majority's ap-
proach "is but another step in the denigration of privacy principles settled
nearly 100 years ago." Id. at 414 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Marshall re-
marked:
The Fifth Amendment basis for resisting production of a document
pursuant to subpoena, the Court tells us today, lies not in the docu-
ment's contents, . . . but in the tacit verification inherent in the act of
production itself...
This technical and somewhat esoteric focus on the testimonial ele-
ments of production rather than on the content of the evidence the in-
vestigator seeks is ... contrary to the history and traditions of the
privilege against self-incrimination ....
Id. at 431 (Marshall, J., concurring).
153. See id. at 412 n.12 (Brennan, J., concurring). See also Couch v. United
States, 409 U.S. 322, 330 (1973); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 698-99
(1944); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).
154. See 425 U.S. at 413.
155. 541 F.2d 329 (2d Cir. 1976).
156. Id. at 331.
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rently in the taxpayer's possession. On remand from the
Supreme Court,157 the Second Circuit Court refused to read
Fisher "as detracting from the principle that the fifth amend-
ment protects against compulsory production of a paper writ-
ten by an accused with respect to his own affairs... and now
in his possession, even though he may have. .. sent it to an-
other with the expectation that the latter would retain it."' 58
It is unfortunate that courts may now have to rely on the
evidentiary concept of authentication to protect taxpayers from
the potential self-incriminating testimonial aspect of producing
their own private papers. 59 Functionally, what one has written
is just as testimonial as what one has spoken, the only differ-
ence being that written testimony does not disappear once ut-
tered. Thus, if the production of a person's incriminating
writings is compelled by summons, that person has been forced
to testify against himself just as if he were compelled to verbal-
ize the information. In this respect, there is a significant dis-
tinction between the protections of the fourth and fifth
amendments. If the incriminating papers are seized as a result
of a search warrant, the individual has not been personally
compelled to turn them over; rather, the government has been
permitted to take them. But a summons, unlike a search war-
rant, compels the individual to act, and the evil that the fifth
amendment was designed to guard against is as present in a
compelled production of one's own written testimony as it is in
compelled speech.
Since lower courts are not reading Fisher as totally voiding
the fifth amendment's applicability to taxpayers' own private
papers,160 it would be helpful to note the other major limitation
on the availability of its protection: it is available only when
the danger of criminal prosecution exists.' 6 ' If, when the sum-
mons is issued, the statute of limitations has run on all possible
criminal prosecutions, the privilege is not available. 162 The bur-
den is on the government, however, to show both that the stat-
157. 425 U.S. 967 (1976), remanding 522 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1975).
158. 541 F.2d at 331.
159. See, e.g., Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 330 (1973); United States
v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 698-99 (1944); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630
(1886); United States v. Beattie, 541 F.2d 329, 331 (2d Cir. 1976).
160. See, e.g., United States v. Pleson, 560 F.2d 890, 893 (8th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 434 U.S. 966 (1977); United States v. Beattie, 541 F.2d 329, 331 (2d Cir.
1976); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum served upon John Doe, 466 F.
Supp. 325, 327 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); In re Bernstein, 425 F. Supp. 37, 39 (S.D. Fla.
1977).




ute has run and "that no prosecution has been begun within
that period, or, if begun, that it has been discontinued in such
[a] manner as to protect the witness from further prosecu-
tion."163
B. COMMON LAW PRIVILEGES
It is a settled issue that federal courts do not recognize an
accountant-client privilege. The Supreme Court, in Couch v.
United States,164 cited with approval a Fifth Circuit decision 65
which held that there is no common law privilege between cli-
ent and accountant. In Couch, the petitioner raised an objec-
tion based on "the confidential nature of the accountant-client
relationship,"'166 when her accountant was summoned to pro-
duce certain records that she had conveyed to him for tax re-
turn preparation. The Court decided the case on other
grounds, but stated that "[a] Ithough not in itself controlling, we
note that no confidential accountant-client privilege exists
under federal law and no state-created privilege has been rec-
ognized in federal cases. '167 The Court reasoned that since dis-
closure of such information is required on tax returns, "there
can be little expectation of privacy when the records are
handed to an accountant."'168 The Court also pointed to ac-
countants' potential criminal liability if they knowingly assist
in the preparation of false returns as mandating that account-
ants have the right to disclose information given to them by cli-
ents.169 Finally, the Court concluded that it would be improper
to extend the requested protection "in the very situation where
obligations of disclosure exist and under a system largely de-
pendent upon honest self-reporting even to survive.' ' 70
The Court's reasoning in Couch makes it clear that an ac-
countant-client privilege should not be available when an ac-
countant has been engaged solely for the purpose of preparing
a tax return. A strong argument can be made, however, in sup-
port of an accountant-client privilege when an accountant
maintains a taxpayer's regular business records. By adding
section 7609 to the Code, Congress attempted to limit the Serv-
163. Id. at 262.
164. 409 U.S. 322 (1973).
165. Falsone v. United States, 205 F.2d 734 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S.
864 (1953).







ice's intrusion into taxpayers' expected zone of privacy.17 1
More specifically, Congress included accountants as section
7609 third-party record keepers. 17 2 Yet, according to the Court
in Couch, there can be little expectation of privacy when
records are handed over to an accountant. It is difficult to un-
derstand the benefit of section 7609 if it does not give a tax-
payer a valid objection to the production of documents in his
accountant's possession. Given the government's interest in
voluntary compliance with the tax laws,173 it should encourage
taxpayers to seek the same competent advice concerning their
fiscal affairs that it encourages them to seek, by recognizing the
attorney-client privilege, in connection with their legal af-
fairs.174
Courts are hopelessly split regarding the extent of the priv-
ilege 175 when an attorney engaged in tax work is not an ac-
countant, or when he serves both as an attorney and an
accountant. One approach to this problem, illustrated by
Canaday v. United States,176 is that no attorney-client privilege
is created when an attorney prepares a client's tax return since
the attorney has not acted as a lawyer, but only as a scrivener.
Another approach is found in Colton v. United States, 77 in
which the court stated that information that is reported on a
tax return is not privileged, -but that information provided to an
attorney and not included in a return is covered. One problem
with the Colton approach is that the taxpayer must contest
171. See H.R. REP., supra note 32, at 307, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2897, 3203.
172. I.R.C. § 7609(a)(3)(F).
173. See text accompanying notes 1-2 supra.
174. The acknowledged social policy behind the attorney-client privilege is
that it promotes justice by encouraging clients to make full factual disclosures
to their attorneys. See generally McCoRMIcK's HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EvI-
DENCE § 87 (2d ed. 1972).
175. See generally Bender, A Review of Privileged Communications as Ap-
plied to Tax Fraud Proceedings, 23 TuL. TAx INsT. 237 (1974); Harper, To Coop-
erate with Service or Not? Obligations and Rights of the Practitioner, 42 J. TAX.
220 (1975); Johnson, Present Status of Taxpayers' Rights and Privileges with Re-
spect to Self-Incrimination, Searches and Seizures and Privileged Communica-
tions, 26 S. CAL. TAX INST. 1017 (1974); Lofts, Attorney-Client Privilege in
Federal Tax Investigations, 19 TAX L. REv. 405 (1964); Peterson, Attorney-Client
Privilege in Internal Revenue Service Investigations, 54 MINN. L REv. 67 (1969);
Silver, Courts are Upholding Attorney-Client Privilege in Anonymous Payment
Situations, 43 J. TAX. 358 (1975); Steinhaus, Privileged Communication in Tax
Practice: How it Began, Where it Stands, 15 Tut. TAX INST. 530 (1965); Note,
Taxpayer Expectations of Privacy as a Bar to Production of Records Held by
His Attorney, 16 WM. & MARY L. REv. 666 (1975); Comment, Taxation-Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination, 44 Miss. L. REV. 1034 (1973).
176. 354 F.2d 849 (8th Cir. 1966).
177. 306 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1962).
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each item of information summoned so that the court can de-
cide whether the material is directly related to information on
the return. Some district courts have followed a third ap-
proach, enforcing the full privilege for all aspects of an attor-
ney's tax practice to encourage complete freedom of
consultation. 7 8
The privilege question is further complicated when an at-
torney is also certified as an accountant. With this combination
present, some courts have held that tax work is accounting, not
legal work, and have viewed the attorney-accountant as an ac-
countant for the purpose of the attorney-client privilege.179
Other courts have analyzed the nature of the work done, and
have followed a Colton item-by-item approach in determining
what information should be revealed. 180
The case of Fisher v. United States'8 ' has placed a judicial
gloss on the privilege question regarding both attorneys who
are engaged in connection with the filing of tax returns, and
those who are sought exclusively for legal advice concerning
tax-related matters. Fisher held that pre-existing documents,
transferred by a client to his attorney in order to obtain in-
formed legal advice, are protected by the attorney-client privi-
lege only to the extent that they would have been protected
from disclosure while in the taxpayer's possession. 182
In reaching this conclusion, the Court stressed that the
purpose of the attorney-client privilege is to encourage clients
to make full disclosure to their attorneys. 8 3 The Court felt'that
this goal is achieved so long as the client knows that it will be
no easier for the Service to obtain the documents from his at-
torney than from him.'84 Thus, if an IRS summons directs an
attorney to produce pre-existing documents, the privilege may
be successfully invoked only if the taxpayer can show that he
personally would not have had to produce them because of a
valid fourth or fifth Amendment objection, or because they are
sought for an illegal purpose 8 5
The Court in Fisher emphasized that the privilege should
178. See, e.g., United States v. Long, 328 F. Supp. 233 (E.D. Mo. 1971); United
States v. Summe, 208 F. Supp. 925 (ED. Ky. 1965).
179. See, e.g., Olender v. United States, 210 F.2d 795 (9th Cir. 1954), cert. de-
nied, 352 U.S. 982 (1957).
180. See, e.g., United States v. Threlkeld, 241 F. Supp. 324 (W.D. Tenn. 1965).
181. 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
182. Id. at 404-05.
183. Id. at 403.
184. See id. at 403-04.
185. The Fisher Court noted that 'the papers, if unobtainable by summons
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be extended no further than is necessary to accomplish its pur-
pose. It also stressed that the privilege was designed to protect
confidential disclosures made in order to obtain legal assist-
ance. 186 This reasoning supports the approach taken in Colton
v. United States. 8 7 Thus, documents provided to attorneys for
the purpose of tax return preparation would not be confidential
disclosures of the type contemplated by Fisher, because they
are not within the legal advice requirement. On the other
hand, if the documents sought were provided to an attorney in
order to obtain legal advice, and not simply for tax return prep-
aration, then the stated test of Fisher would apply.
The same rationale should apply to work papers of an at-
torney which reflect verbal communications of a taxpayer-cli-
ent. To the extent that the information sought was conveyed
for tax-preparation purposes, the attorney-client privilege
would not be available because the information does not con-
sist of confidential communications made to obtain legal advice.
If the communications were made to obtain legal advice, how-
ever, the attorney's work papers would be completely outside
the reach of the Service.
It seems, therefore, that the constitutional and common
law objections to compliance, while waning in importance, are
still of some value to taxpayers. Particularly, the fifth amend-
ment and attorney-client arguments appear capable of ac-
comodating some taxpayer rights. It is the statutory
requirement that a summons be issued for a legitimate pur-
pose, however, which has always held the most promise for tax-
payers.
VI. THE LEGITIMATE PURPOSE OBJECTION
For the past fifteen years, the primary taxpayer challenge
to IRS summonses has focused on the requirement that the
summons be issued pursuant to an investigation conducted for
a legitimate purpose.188 Specifically, the issue has been the ex-
tent to which taxpayers may successfully defend against en-
forcement of an IRS summons by arguing that enforcement
may result in the discovery of criminal as well as civil liability.
The actual problem courts have struggled with, though, is
from the client, are unobtainable by summons directed to the attorney by rea-
son of the attorney-client privilege." Id. at 405.
186. Id. at 403 (citing 8 J. WiGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2291 (McNaughton rev.
1961)).
187. 306 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1962); see text accompanying note 177 supra.
188. See text accompanying note 29 supra.
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not whether section 7602 can be invoked to gather evidence for
the sole purpose of determining criminal liability, but rather,
how to determine whether a particular summons was issued
for a legitimate purpose-the investigation of civil tax liabil-
ity.189 This inquiry has been complicated by the fact that the
IRS is charged with the dual responsibility of obtaining civil
enforcement of the tax laws and of recommending the criminal
prosecution of certain taxpayers to the Justice Department.
Prior to the Supreme Court case of Reisman v. Caplin,9 0
which dealt with the appropriate procedure for enforcing and
challenging IRS summonses, few lower courts had considered
the criminal evidence issue. The impetus for litigating the
criminal evidence issue came from some ill-considered lan-
guage in Reisman, which stated that "in any of these proce-
dures [for challenging enforcement] the witness may challenge
the summons on any appropriate ground. This would include,
as the circuits have held, the defense that the material is sought
for the improper purpose of obtaining evidence for [its] use in a
criminal prosecution."''
Courts faced with the task of interpreting Reisman began
to distinguish between those situations in which the sole objec-
tive of the investigation was to obtain evidence for criminal
prosecution and those in which the investigation was intended
to explore both civil and criminal liability. 92 Some courts went
so far as to condone the Service's use of summonses for the pri-
mary purpose of uncovering criminal evidence so long as the
criminal prosecution had not been formally commenced. 9
3
189. The purposes for which the Service may legitimately issue a sum-
mons-ascertaining the correctness of a return, making a return, determining
liability for internal revenue tax, and collecting such liability, see LR.C. § 7602-
all arise out of the Service's collection power. It is implicit in this enumeration
of purposes that the Service is not empowered to use section 7602 summonses
for the sole purpose of obtaining criminal evidence. See Reisman v. Caplin, 375
U.S. 440, 449 (1964).
190. 375 U.S. 440 (1964).
191. Id. at 449 (emphasis added) (citing Boren v. Tucker, 239 F.2d 767, 772-73
(9th Cir. 1956)). In Boren, the court enforced an IRS summons even though
there existed a possibility that criminal prosecution might occur once the infor-
mation was handed over to the government. 239 F.2d at 772. The Boren court
distinguished a contrary holding in United States v. O'Connor, 118 F. Supp. 248
(D. Mass. 1953), one ground being that O'Connor involved a taxpayer already
under indictment. 239 F.2d at 772-73.
192. See, e.g., United States v. Giordano, 419 F.2d 564 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 1037 (1969); United States v. Hayes, 408 F.2d 932 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 835 (1969); Wild v. United States, 362 F.2d 206 (9th Cir. 1966).
193. See, e.g., Howfield, Inc. v. United States, 409 F.2d 694, 697 (9th Cir. 1969);




In 1971, the Supreme Court finally confronted the problems
created by Reisman. In Donaldson v. United States,194 the tax-
payer argued that summonses issued to his employer and his
employer's accountant were outside the scope of section 7602
because their issuance, by agents of the Service's Intelligence
Division,195 indicated that the investigation was concerned not
only with civil liability, but also with the possible recommenda-
tion of criminal prosecution. 196
The Court rejected this argument because it clashed with
the Service's dual responsibility to conduct investigations relat-
ing to the collection of civil penalties, and to refer certain cases
to the Justice Department for criminal prosecution. 97 More-
over, the Court was unable to discern any specific congres-
sional prohibition against the use of summonses in
investigations that may expose criminal liability. 98 In fact, it
found implicit authority for such use of summonses in the rela-
tionship between the Code's definition of tax-which includes
any addition or penalty199 -and the Intelligence Division's au-
thority to aid in the collection of penalties.20 0 Thus, the Court
concluded that there was "no statutory suggestion for any
meaningful line of distinction, for civil as compared with crimi-
nal purposes, at the point of a special agent's appearance."20
1
The Court believed that to infer such a line of demarcation
would require the Service either to forego the use of its sum-
mons power to discover civil fraud or to forego its duty to rec-
ommend that certain taxpayers be prosecuted.20 2 Since such a
result would thwart and defeat the broad responsibilities of the
Service,20 3 the Court held "that under [section] 7602 an inter-
nal revenue summons may be issued in aid of an investigation
if it is issued in good faith and prior to a recommendation for
criminal prosecution.''2 °4
The controversy that followed Donaldson centered on two
issues the Court failed to clarify. First, while Donaldson indi-
194. 400 U.S. 517 (1971).
195. The Intelligence Division of the IRS has recently been redesignated
the Criminal Enforcement Division. Int. Rev. News Release, ER-1951 (Feb. 6,
1978).
196. 400 U.S. at 521.
197. See id. at 535-36.




202. See id. at 535-36.
203. See id. at 533.
204. Id. at 536 (emphasis added).
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cated that a summons issued prior to a recommendation for
criminal prosecution was presumptively issued in good faith, it
neglected to reveal which recommendation was the critical one:
the initial recommendation of the special agent, the ultimate
recommendation of the Service to the Justice Department, or
some intermediate recommendation. 205 Second, Donaldson did
not discuss whether a summons issued prior to criminal recom-
mendation was conclusively presumed to have been issued in
good faith, or whether taxpayers could rebut the presumption
of good faith by demonstrating that the summons had been is-
sued for the sole purpose of gathering criminal evidence.206
The Supreme Court recently addressed both of these un-
resolved issues in United States v. LaSalle National Bank.207
In a five-to-four opinion, the Court held that the critical recom-
mendation which a summons must precede is the one ulti-
mately made by the Service to the Justice Department.20 8 The
Court also identified a second good faith requirement: the sole
purpose of the investigation, in an institutional sense, must not
be to further a criminal prosecution.20 9
At the enforcement hearing in LaSalle, the taxpayer ar-
gued that the summons had been issued by an IRS special
agent whose sole purpose was to gather evidence for criminal
prosecution. The trial court concluded that there was nothing
in the special agent's testimony "to suggest that the thought of
a civil investigation ever crossed his mind,"210 and that it was
"an improper use of the summons 'to serve it solely for the pur-
pose of obtaining evidence for use in a criminal prosecu-
tion.'"211 The Seventh Circuit, relying on Donaldson,2 12
205. Compare United States v. Hodge and Zwieg, 548 F.2d 1347 (9th Cir.
1977) and United States v. Billingsley, 469 F.2d 1208 (10th Cir. 1972) (recom-
mendation to Justice Department) with United States v. Lafko, 520 F.2d 622 (3d
Cir. 1975) (recommendation made within the IRS).
206. Compare United States v. Hodge and Zwieg, 548 F.2d 1347 (9th Cir.
1977); United States v. Zack, 521 F.2d 1366 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v. Mc-
Carthy, 514 F.2d 368 (3d Cir. 1975); United States v. Wiengarden, 473 F.2d 454
(6th Cir. 1973) and United States v. Billingsley, 469 F.2d 1208 (10th Cir. 1972)
(summons issued prior to formal recommendation is issued in bad faith if its
sole purpose is to aid in a criminal investigation) with United States v. Morgan
Guar. Trust Co., 572 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 89 (1979) and
United States v. Troupe, 438 F.2d 117 (8th Cir. 1971) (summons issued prior to
formal recommendation is conclusively presumed to have been issued in good
faith).
207. 437 U.S. 298 (1978).
208. Id. at 311.
209. Id. at 316-17.
210. Id. at 303.
211. Id. at 304.
212. See text accompanying notes 194-204 supra.
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affirmed, concluding that the lower court properly included the
issue of criminal purpose within the good faith inquiry, and
that the lower court's determination that the summonses were
issued for the sole purpose of furthering a criminal prosecution
was not clearly erroneous.21 3
The Supreme Court reversed, reasoning that "the language
of Donaldson ... must be read in the light of the recognition of
the interrelated criminal/civil nature of a tax fraud inquiry."214
As it had in Donaldson, the Court examined the multi-layer re-
view structure of the Service,215 and emphasized the fact that
only after officials in at least two of the layers had concurred in
the special agent's recommendation was an official referral to
the Justice Department made. The Court noted: "At any of the
various stages, the Service can abandon the criminal prosecu-
tion, can decide instead to assert a civil penalty, or can pursue
both goals. While the special agent is an important actor in the
process, his motivation is hardly dispositive. '' 216 Accordingly,
the Court declined the opportunity to base the line of demarca-
tion between criminal and civil purpose on the special agent's
personal intent. Instead, it created the institutional good faith
test, which taxpayers can meet only by disproving "the actual
existence of a valid civil tax determination or collection pur-
pose by the Service. '217 The Court observed, in gross under-
statement, that "this burden is a heavy one," but suggested
that it might be met by a showing that an institutional commit-
ment to make the referral had already been made, and that the
Service was delaying its official referral in order to gather addi-
tional evidence for prosecution. 218 The Court also stated that
213. United States v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 554 F.2d 302, 309 (1977).
214. 437 U.S. at 315.
215. Id. at 314-16. See also Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 534-35
(1970).
216. 437 U.S. at 315.
217. Id. at 316.
218. The majority criticized the dissent's view that the good-faith inquiry
should be abandoned altogether, see id. at 316-17, arguing that the dissenting
opinion reveals a "fundamental misunderstanding about the authority of the
IRS." See id. at 316 n.18. Citing the purposes enumerated in section 7602, see
note 7 supra, the Court stated that "Congress. . . intended the summons au-
thority to be used to aid the determination and collection of taxes. These pur-
poses do not include the goal of filing criminal charges against citizens.
Consequently, summons authority does not exist to aid criminal investigations
solely." 437 U.S. at 317 n.18. The Court declared, "We shall not countenance de-
lay in submitting a recommendation to the Justice Department when there is
an institutional commitment to make the referral and the Service merely would
like to gather additional evidence for the prosecution." Id. at 316-17. As a re-
sult of this chastisement of the dissent, taxpayers have begun to make the de-
lay argument with vigor. See United States v. Serubo, No. 78-2805 (3d Cir. Aug.
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"the good-faith standard will not permit the IRS to become an
information gathering agency for other departments, including
the Department of Justice, regardless of the status of criminal
cases."
219
The dissent attacked this new test as wholly unworkable
and predicted that it would produce "little but endless discov-
ery... and ultimate frustration of the fair administration of
the ... Code." 220 The dissenters favored adoption of Donald-
son's objective timing test: if a summons has been issued prior
to a recommendation for criminal prosecution, it is conclusively
presumed to have been issued in good faith.22 1 The dissenters'
objections to the institutional good faith test are sound. It is
difficult to imagine a situation in which a taxpayer could prove
that an institutional commitment to refer for criminal prosecu-
tion had been purposely delayed so that the Service could
gather more information for prosecution.
The recent case of United States v. Chase Manhattan
Bank,222 however, shows that at least one court has attempted
to give the institutional good faith test some viability. In Chase
Manhattan, the Second Circuit reversed and remanded a trial
court order enforcing a third-party summons served on a bank
by an IRS agent. Prior to commencement of the investigation,
the taxpayer was the subject of an FBI and federal grand jury
investigation concerning alleged violations of the Interstate
Travel Act.2  It was undisputed that criminal indictment of
the taxpayer was imminent in October 1977,224 yet that indict-
ment was inexplicably delayed. Meanwhile, an IRS investiga-
tion had been. commenced, based on information received by
the Service from the FBI,2 2 5 and on May 1, 1978, more than six
months after the "imminent" indictment, an IRS summons was
issued to the taxpayer's bank.
The enforcement hearing became an affidavit swearing
match between the taxpayer's attorneys and the IRS agents.
The taxpayer contended that the summons was issued by the
IRS as a substitute for grand jury subpoenas and search war-
rants, and that it was issued to aid an investigation initiated
20, 1979); United States v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 598 F.2d 321 (2d Cir. 1979);
United States v. Genser, 595 F.2d 146 (3d Cir. 1979).
219. 437 U.S. at 317.
220. Id. at 320 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
221. Id.
222. 598 F.2d 321 (2d Cir. 1979).
223. Id. at 324.
224. Id. at 324, 325.
225. Id. at 326, 327.
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and requested by the FBI and Department of Justice, not to aid
a civil tax investigation.226 The agents swore that they had
never stated that the Service was solely interested in criminal
tax fraud, and that they had not disclosed any information to
the FBI or Justice Department to aid these agencies in their
criminal case.227 The district court ordered enforcement since
it found the taxpayer had shown "'no facts from which bad
faith can be concluded.' "228 The circuit court, on remand, in-
structed the lower court to allow the taxpayer an opportunity
for limited discovery to determine whether the delay of the
non-tax criminal indictment was connected in an improper way
to compliance with the IRS summons. 229 The court relied on
the second requirement of the institutional good faith test sug-
gested by the Supreme Court in LaSalle: that the summons
not be issued to gather information for other departments for
non-tax prosecutions. 23 0
If IRS agents, or agents of other governmental depart-
ments, are sufficiently accommodating to reveal to outsiders
the Service's true improper purposes, as they allegedly did in
Chase Manhattan,23 1 the institutional good faith test may work
in a few rare cases. If an intelligent response by the Service to
Chase Manhattan can be assumed, however, the institutional
good faith test will soon become totally unworkable. In Chase
Manhattan, if the agents, during the discovery process ordered
on remand, continue to assert that they were interested only in
tax violations, it is not clear how the limited discovery allowed
by the court will ultimately prevent the enforcement of the
summons.232 The case, therefore, may be no more than a clear
226. Id. at 322.
227. Id. at 325.
228. Id. at 323.
229. Id. at 327, 328.
230. Id. at 327.
231. Id. at 324.
232. The Third Circuit has recently decided a number of cases that deal
with the issue of the extent to which courts should allow taxpayers discovery
as a pre-enforcement tactic. The test is two-part; the taxpayer has a right to
limited discovery, and if it proves fruitful, he is entitled to broaden the scope of
his discovery. In United States v. Genser, 595 F.2d 146 (3d Cir. 1979), the court
said:
At a minimum, the taxpayer should be entitled to discover the
identities of the investigating agents, the date the investigation began,
the dates the agent or agents filed reports recommending prosecution,
... and the dates of all summonses issued under 26 U.S.C. § 7602. Fur-
thermore, the taxpayer should be entitled to discover the nature of any
contacts, relating to and during the investigation, between the investi-
gating agents and officials of the Department of Justice.
Where this information or other evidence introduced by the tax-
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example of the endless discovery and ultimate frustration al-
luded to by the dissenting justices in LaSale.2 33
For all practical purposes, the LaSalle dissenters' timing
test-that any IRS summons issued prior to an official recom-
mendation for criminal prosecution by the Service is conclu-
sively presumed to have been issued in good faith234--will
become the legal standard by which IRS summonses are judg-
ed. But the timing test is unsatisfactory because it grants the
IRS virtually unlimited power to compel taxpayers to produce
the very evidence that may lead to their criminal convictions
even though the usual safeguards given an individual in a crim-
inal investigation are absent.235
The major problem with the line of cases which culminates
in LaSalle is that the Court has approached challenges to en-
forcement as if they call into question the ultimate necessity of
the Service's summoning power. These cases did not challenge
the broad power of the Service to summon documents in order
to properly administer the tax laws. It must be remembered
that the protection taxpayers enjoyed under the erstwhile Reis-
man doctrine-the right to withhold information upon proof
that a special agent's sole purpose in issuing a summons was to
develop evidence for criminal prosecution 236-was a very nar-
row protection.
payer reveals (1) that the IRS issued summonses after the investigat-
ing agents recommended prosecution, (2) that inordinate and
unexplained delays in the investigation transpired, or (3) that the in-
vestigating agents were in contact with the Department of Justice, the
district court must allow the taxpayer to investigate further. In proper
cases, this investigation could include the opportunity to examine the
IRS agents or officials involved, or to discover documents. Such exami-
nation/discovery, however, should be carefully tailored to meet the
purpose of the inquiry. On the other hand, where this information indi-
cates that none of these three conditions are present, the district court
need inquire no further.
Id. at 152. See also United States v. Serubo, No. 78-2805 (3d Cir. Aug. 20, 1979).
The Genrer test, however, should not be taken as an indication that the Third
Circuit will treat the institutional bad faith objection as creating an easily met
bar to enforcement. On the contrary, in its latest summons enforcement deci-
sion, United States v. Garden State Nat'l Bank, No. 79-1425, slip op. at 16-18 (3d
Cir. Oct. 10, 1979), the Third Circuit has clarified the fact that the LaSalle-
Genser-Serubo line of cases is meant to leave open only a "very slight" possi-
bility of evading enforcement by arguing institutional bad faith.
233. 437 U.S. at 320.
234. See id. (Stewart, J., dissenting).
235. See United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48 (1964). Taxpayers are not even
entitled to be warned that the information gathered by means of the adminis-
trative summons can be used against them in criminal proceedings. See Beck-
with v. United States, 425 U.S. 341 (1976).
236. See text accompanying notes 190-193 supra.
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The real issue before the Court in all these cases was
whether the Service may use its administrative summoning
power for the sole purpose of gathering evidence for criminal
prosecution even though its power is unencumbered by the
traditional safeguards that attach to other criminal inquiries.
The LaSalle Court took note of the fact that Congress "in-
tended the summons authority to be used to aid the determina-
tion and collection of taxes,"237 and that this purpose did not
"include the goal of filing criminal charges against citizens. '238
Given this recognition, it is difficult to imagine how the Court
concluded that it should enforce a summons admittedly issued
for the sole purpose of gathering evidence for criminal prosecu-
tion. Logically, the interrelated civil-criminal nature of certain
IRS investigations should have led the Court to draw the line
on bad-faith issuance at the point where the agent in charge ad-
mit that the sole purpose for issuing the summons was to fur-
ther a criminal investigation. The unworkable institutional
good-faith test, which ignores the intent of the agent at the time
of issuance, is nothing more than a judicial expansion of an al-
ready broad power which cannot be reconciled with the stat-
ute's express purpose.
Another problem with LaSalle is the Court's attempt to
justify the institutional good-faith test by pointing out that at
many levels along its chain of command, the Service "can aban-
don the criminal prosecution [and] decide instead to assert a
civil penalty. '2 39 This reasoning ignores the fact that the power
to issue and enforce a summons is granted only to support civil,
and not criminal, investigations. An after-the-fact abandon-
ment of an admittedly illegal purpose is, notwithstanding the
Service's argument, insufficient to justify enforcement of an un-
lawful summons.
In addition, the Court's reliance on the Service's many lay-
ers of review to "provide the taxpayer with substantial protec-
tion against the ... overzealous judgment of the special
agent"2 ° is patently absurd. It is difficult to understand how
either a conference with district Criminal Enforcement Divi-
sion officials,24 1 or notification that the case has been referred
to the Regional Counsel with a prosecution recommendation, 242
237. 437 U.S. at 317 n.18.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 315.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 315-16.
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protects a taxpayer from the overzealous agent whose improper
collection of evidence provided the impetus for such conference
or notification.
Realistically, the institutional decision to recommend crim-
inal prosecution will be made solely on the strength of the evi-
dence gathered by the investigating agent. Since the Court in
LaSalle has deemed the intent of the agent irrelevant, there is
no reason to suspect that the Service will consider the agent's
intent in weighing the strength of its case. Rather, it will con-
sider everything the agent has discovered, and will abandon
the criminal investigation only if the evidence is insufficient.
Since the Court has left taxpayers with virtually.no effec-
tive objection to IRS summonses issued pursuant to a criminal
investigation,243 resisting taxpayers must move toward new ob-
jections calculated to separate the Service's civil enforcement
motives from its criminal prosecution motives. For instance, a
taxpayer with solid evidence that a summons implicating him
was issued solely by an agent to further a criminal investiga-
tion should ask the trial court to make a finding to that effect.
If the court complies, the taxpayer should then request that the
court rule either that any evidence resulting from the summons
be excluded from future criminal proceedings, or that the tax-
payer be granted immunity from criminal prosecution arising
from such evidence, unless the investigating agent can show
probable cause at the enforcement hearing. In this way, the
Service could demonstrate institutional good faith by using the
information it secured for a proper purpose: to determine civil
tax liability. At the same time, taxpayers would regain some
realistic protection against overzealous agents who have
stepped beyond the scope of their authority to secure informa-
tion through judicial compulsion.
243. The delayed recommendation objection has provided a temporary de-
lay in enforcement in a few instances. See United States v. Chase Manhattan
Bank, 598 F.2d 321 (2d Cir. 1979); United States v. Genser, 595 F.2d 146 (3d Cir.
1979). But see United States v. Genser, 602 F.2d 69 (3d Cir. 1979) (enforcing
summons stayed in United States v. Genser, 595 F.2d 146 (3d Cir. 1979), since
appellants failed to meet burden of disproving existence of valid civil tax pur-
pose on part of Service). But, as the Service adapts its strategy to the delayed
recommendation objection, see text accompanying notes 232-234 supra, the ob-
jection may lose any vitality. Furthermore, the difficulty in proving that a delay
was in bad faith is exaggerated by the fact that courts seem inclined only to
allow limited discovery by taxpayers unless a substantial case of bad faith has
already been made out. See note 232 supra. See also United States v. Church
of Scientology, 520 F.2d 818, 824-25 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v. McCarthy,




VII. A PROPOSAL FOR THE PARTIAL IMPOSITION OF A
PROBABLE CAUSE REQUIREMENT ON IRS
SUMMONSES
The problem caused by the dual function of the Service has
been recognized by the Supreme Court.2 " Its solution, how-
ever, has been to allow the proper purpose of the summons
power-the determination and collection of civil liabilities-to
camouflage criminal investigations that may be proceeding at
the same time. The Court has refused to find that Congress in-
tended the IRS' summons authority to end where suspected
criminal liability begins, 245 and because of the overlapping na-
ture of the two functions of the Service, this interpretation may
be pragmatic. But if Congress really meant that IRS sum-
monses could be used to determine criminal liabilities as well
as civil liabilities, the Court should be scrutinizing this sum-
mons power to ensure the applicability of constitutional safe-
guards, rather than assisting a government agency in
circumventing them.
The problem is that the Court has treated the criminal in-
vestigation aspect as merely incidental to the important collec-
tion function, and, in doing so, has lost sight of the real issue.
The issue is not whether the imposition of criminal investiga-
tion standards would interfere with the government's right to
collect taxes; it is whether the government's power to collect
taxes can interfere with the constitutional protections guaran-
teed to an individual who is the subject of a criminal investiga-
tion. The criminal liability aspect of the tax laws is entitled to
priority in any consideration of the IRS' summons power.
When a government agency serves two masters, the rules of
the stricter master must prevail.
The problems caused by the dual nature of the Service's
mission do not lend themselves to simple solution. The unnec-
essary imposition of a probable cause standard on all IRS sum-
monses would greatly hamper the Service's authority to
investigate civil matters, and would open the door to increased
tax evasion. There are less burdensome means, however, of
achieving fairness than by imposing a probable cause standard
in all cases.
In United States v. LaSalle National Bank,24 6 the Court did
244. See United States v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 437 U.S. 298 (1978); Donaldson
v. United States, 400 U.S. 517 (1971).
245. See text accompanying notes 207-208 supra.
246. 437 U.S. 298 (1978).
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not feel that the appearance of a Criminal Enforcement Divi-
sion agent in the investigation should be the controlling factor
in the criminal/civil line of demarcation. But as a practical
matter, this appearance is the most appropriate place to draw
the line. The express purpose of the Criminal Enforcement Di-
vision is to "enforce the criminal statutes applicable to... tax
laws ... by developing information concerning alleged crimi-
nal violations thereof,.., investigating suspected criminal vio-
lations [and] recommending prosecution when warranted.' 247
If the Court is unwilling to limit the use of section 7602 sum-
monses to divisions charged primarily with civil collection du-
ties, then the summonses issued by criminal enforcement
agents should have to meet a probable cause standard. It
should be irrelevant that civil liability may also be found once
the Criminal Enforcement Division is involved in an investiga-
tion, as it should be irrelevant that the Service may ultimately
choose not to seek criminal sanctions.248
The Service could circumvent such a probable cause stan-
dard, however, by delaying the Criminal Enforcement Divi-
sion's involvement in a case until the Examination Division 249
has gathered all the information needed. There are three ways
to avoid this problem. First, a probable cause standard could
be imposed on all Service summonses,250 but this would unduly
hamper the Service in its vital civil enforcement function. Sec-
ond, criminal sanctions for Code violations could be abolished
in favor of harsher civil penalties for willful violations. This
would increase IRS revenues while maintaining the monetary
incentive for voluntary compliance. It would also remove any
appearance of impropriety in the use of its broad powers that
could tarnish the Service's image. Finally, the Service could be
247. IRS Statement of Organization and Functions, 39 Fed. Reg. 11,572,
11,607 (1974).
248. In LaSalle, the Court, citing the 1976 Annual Report of the Commis-
sioner of the Internal Revenue Service 33,61,152, noted that "[s]tatistics for the
fiscal year 1976 show that the Intelligence Division has... greater involvement
with civil fraud than with criminal fraud." The Court pointed out that "[o]f
8,797 full-scale tax fraud investigations in that year only 2,037 resulted in rec-
ommendations for prosecution." 437 U.S. at 309, 310 n.12 (emphasis added).
249. The Examination Division, at both the district and regional levels, is
the division charged with selection and examination of returns for audit and
generally with the determination of tax liabilities and penalties. It may also
participate in investigations of civil tax fraud along with the Criminal Enforce-
ment Division. IRS Statement of Organization and Functions, 39 Fed. Reg.
11,572, 11,601, 11,605.06 (1974).
250. The Supreme Court, however, has already acknowledged the inherent
impracticability of this solution. See United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 53, 54
(1964).
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required to determine, prior to the issuance of any summons,
whether it was interested in possible criminal violations. If the
Service elected to pursue both criminal and civil liabilities, it
would be required to establish probable cause before any sum-
mons could be issued. Failure to establish probable cause prior
to the issuance of a summons would bar the Service from rec-
ommending criminal prosecution based on the transaction that
provided the impetus for the summons.
Of these alternatives, the third approach, the effect of
which would be to impose a probable cause standard only on
those summonses issued by agents of the Criminal Enforce-
ment Division, would permit taxpayers to rely much less on the
institutional good faith of the IRS. If one really must rely on
the good faith of the government-an interesting substitute for
constitutional rights-this compromise approach best balances
the interests of government and private individuals.
